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POPULAR CONSTITUTIONALISM AND ITS ENEMIES
G. Alan Tarr*
INTRODUCTION
Chief Justice Robert Utter was acutely aware of the delicate place
occupied by judges in the American system of government. Although
their responsibilities of office obliged them to “say what the law is”1 in
resolving cases, even controversial cases, doing so often required them
to address bodies of law, such as state constitutions, that were relatively
unexplored and that might yield new principles and unexpected
conclusions. Chief Justice Utter recognized that legal counsel could play
an important part in assisting judges in this task, and so in advising
attorneys how to frame state constitutional arguments, he admonished
them to avoid a lazy reliance on federal interpretations of similar
provisions and instead to be aware of “the historical mandates contained
in their state bill[s] of rights.”2 Such well-framed state constitutional
arguments, he argued, could assist justices in developing “a principled,
independent state jurisprudence,” which was essential because “state
courts should be judged on whether they have created a principled body
of state law based on their own independent analysis and
interpretation.”3
Yet Chief Justice Utter also recognized that “the ultimate power of
the courts comes not just from laws and the Constitution but from the
expectation[s] of the public.”4 These public expectations included, at a
* Director, Center for State Constitutional Studies, and Board of Governors Professor of Political
Science, Rutgers University-Camden. The author wishes to thank RJ Norcia for his excellent
research assistance and Rutgers University–Camden and the James Madison Program on American
Ideals and Institutions at Princeton University for their research support.
1. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 177 (1803).
2. Robert F. Utter & Sanford E. Pitler, Presenting a State Constitutional Argument: Comment on
Theory and Technique, 20 IND. L. REV. 635, 677 (1987) [hereinafter Utter & Pitler, Comment on
Theory and Technique]; see also Robert F. Utter, Practice of Principled Decision-Making in State
Constitutionalism: Washington’s Experience, The Emerging Issues in State Constitutional Law, 65
TEMP. L. REV. 1153 (1992).
3. Utter & Pitler, Comment on Theory and Technique, supra note 2, at 652, 676.
4. George Hodak, Judges in the Culture Wars Crossfire, A.B.A. J. (Oct. 29, 2005, 9:14 AM),
http://www.abajournal.com/magazine/article/judges_in_the_culture_wars_crossfire
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minimum, judicial impartiality, resulting in decisions “without
restriction, improper influence, inducements, pressures, threats or
interference[—]direct or indirect.”5 The people expected a judicial
commitment to the rule of law, i.e. deciding cases based not on the
judges’ personal views but on what the law requires. More generally, the
people were concerned with the substance of the legal principles courts
announced, as well as with the courts’ overall role in the political
system. Chief Justice Utter acknowledged “the ideal of democratic
accountability of the public servant no matter what the position of
power” and the danger that “the more the judiciary is independent of
popular pressures, the greater the risk of the judiciary straying from
strongly-held popular values.”6 However, he also cautioned that public
expectations should not interfere with the rule of law: “the more the
judiciary is accountable to popular pressures, the greater the risk it may
lose its role of independent protector of nonmajoritarian interests and
rights.”7 Rather, what judicial accountability required was that “state
judges [be] aware of the need to be sensitive to public concerns and to
carefully explain [how the] value choices that must be made in decisions
are chosen.”8
Such explanations were crucial because, as Chief Justice Utter noted,
“state courts typically are democratically accountable” in ways that
federal courts are not.9 Most state judges serve limited terms of office
rather than during good behavior, and roughly ninety percent of state
judges stand for election at some point; therefore citizens can register
their disapproval of judicial decisions by voting the offending judges out
of office.10 In addition, most state constitutions are relatively easy to
amend, so voters may overturn disfavored rulings by constitutional
amendment.11 This of course cuts two ways. If decisions were relatively
[https://perma.cc/HFC2-VWGJ].
5. Id.
6. Robert F. Utter, State Constitutional Law, the United States Supreme Court, and Democratic
Accountability: Is There a Crocodile in the Bathtub, 64 WASH. L. REV. 19, 20 (1989).
7. Id.
8. Id. at 48.
9. Id. at 20.
10. On the selection and tenure of state court judges, see Book of the States 2013: Chapter 5 State
Judicial Branch, COUNCIL ST. GOV’TS (July 1, 2013, 12:00 AM),
http://knowledgecenter.csg.org/kc/system/files/5.7_2013.pdf [https://perma.cc/BL4A-J5GQ]. See
generally G. ALAN TARR, WITHOUT FEAR OR FAVOR: JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE AND JUDICIAL
ACCOUNTABILITY IN THE STATES (2012) [hereinafter TARR, WITHOUT FEAR OR FAVOR].
11. See Book of the States 2013: Chapter 1: State Constitutions, COUNCIL ST. GOV’TS (July 1,
2013, 12:00 AM), http://knowledgecenter.csg.org/kc/content/book-states-2013-chapter-1-state-
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easy to overturn, then the failure to overturn them could be viewed as
popular approval of those rulings. Thus Chief Justice Utter pointed to the
failure of state voters to overturn most “new judicial federalism” rulings
as evidence of “overall support of rights beyond those required by the
federal constitution.”12 In fact, the ready availability of mechanisms for
overturning state court decisions may actually encourage judicial
creativity. If democratic means exist for overturning judicial rulings and
if judges themselves are electorally accountable, then the familiar
arguments about the undemocratic character of judicial review and about
the need for judicial restraint lose much of their force.13
Chief Justice Utter’s comments on the place of the judiciary in the
American system of popular government give us much to ponder. In the
pages that follow I continue the discussion that he started by looking at
the debate over judicial review and popular constitutionalism. More
specifically, I explore popular constitutionalism at both the federal and
state levels. The decision to do so is rooted in part in the simple fact of
dual constitutionalism. The decision is also rooted in the very different
constitutional experience at the federal and state levels. The
distinctiveness of the federal and state constitutional experiences is
crucial for understanding popular constitutionalism in the United
States.14
What role have the people played, and what role should they play, in
American constitutionalism? That these questions are raised at all may
seem odd. After all, the preambles of the United States Constitution and
of American state constitutions confirm that “We the People” have the
authority to establish the fundamental law under which we will live.
These documents in turn draw upon the Declaration of Independence,
which proclaims “the Right of the People to alter or to abolish [an
existing government], and to institute new Government, laying its
foundation on such principles and organizing its powers in such form, as
to them shall seem most likely to effect their Safety and Happiness.”15
constitutions [https://perma.cc/KB2A-UL8W].
12. Robert F. Utter, Don’t Make a Constitutional Case of It, Unless You Must, 73 JUDICATURE
146, 149 (1989).
13. See Robert F. Utter, Freedom and Diversity in a Federal System: Perspectives on State
Constitutions and the Washington Declaration of Rights, 7 U. PUGET SOUND L. REV. 491, 495–96
(1984).
14. See generally JOHN J. DINAN, THE AMERICAN STATE CONSTITUTIONAL TRADITION (2009);
G. ALAN TARR, UNDERSTANDING STATE CONSTITUTIONS (1998) [hereinafter TARR,
UNDERSTANDING].
15. See, e.g., N.Y. CONST. pmbl. (“We The People of the State of New York, grateful to
Almighty God for our Freedom, in order to secure its blessings, DO ESTABLISH THIS
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Yet the founding documents do not conclude the matter, because more is
involved in the constitutional enterprise than merely the creation of a
government; and the popular role in that broader enterprise—both what
the people have done and what they can and should do—has been
debated throughout much of the nation’s history. Indeed, it remains
controversial today.16 For even if there is a consensus on the right of the
people to create constitutions and replace existing constitutions, this
does not resolve how frequently the people should do so and whether
constitutional arrangements should encourage or discourage such
recourse to the people. Nor does it address whether the people likewise
have or should have a monopoly on instituting less fundamental
constitutional changes or whether other institutions can and have
initiated such changes. Nor does it clarify what role, if any, the people
have played and should play—either directly or through institutions
accountable to them—in interpreting or influencing the interpretation of
their constitutions or in protecting the fundamental law against
misinterpretation or evasion of its mandates. Yet these are crucial
questions for American constitutionalism, as they are in any
constitutional regime. Moreover, the answers to these questions may
well vary both over time and depending on whether one is looking at the
federal Constitution or at its state counterparts. To understand the role of
the people in American constitutionalism, it is useful to begin with the
current debate over popular constitutionalism.
I.

POPULAR CONSTITUTIONALISM

James Madison observed of the United States Constitution that “[a]s
the instrument came from [the Convention] it . . . was nothing more than
the draught of a plan, nothing but a dead letter, until life and validity
CONSTITUTION.”). Similar language is found in the preambles of all state constitutions, and
some—for example, the preamble to the Massachusetts Constitution—further specify that “the
people have a right to alter the government” when it fails to serve the purposes for which it was
created. MASS. CONST. pmbl. Several early state constitutions included portions of the Declaration
of Independence in their lengthy preambles.
16. The most influential discussion—and endorsement—of popular constitutionalism is LARRY
D. KRAMER, THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES: POPULAR CONSTITUTIONALISM AND JUDICIAL REVIEW
(2004) [hereinafter KRAMER, THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES]. Other volumes sympathetic to popular
constitutionalism and/or a reduced role for the judiciary in the constitutional realm include CASS R.
SUNSTEIN, ONE CASE AT A TIME: JUDICIAL MINIMALISM ON THE SUPREME COURT (1999); MARK V.
TUSHNET, TAKING THE CONSTITUTION AWAY FROM THE COURTS (1999) [hereinafter TUSHNET,
TAKING THE CONSTITUTION AWAY]; JEREMY WALDRON, LAW AND DISAGREEMENT (1999). For a
magisterial account of the popular role in American constitutionalism during the antebellum era, see
CHRISTIAN G. FRITZ, AMERICAN SOVEREIGNS: THE PEOPLE AND AMERICA’S CONSTITUTIONAL
TRADITION BEFORE THE CIVIL WAR (2008) [hereinafter FRITZ, AMERICAN SOVEREIGNS].
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were breathed into it by the voice of the people, speaking through the
several State Conventions.”17 Few would quarrel with that. But
proponents of popular constitutionalism maintain that the people are not
merely constitutional legislators for a day. Even after a constitution’s
adoption, the people exercise active and ongoing control over its
revision, interpretation, and implementation—they are both the supreme
creators and the supreme expositors of constitutions.18 This is, for
popular constitutionalists, simultaneously a proposition in political
theory, a description of American political practice, and a normative
claim. It is also highly controversial, with skeptics challenging whether
popular constitutionalism was dominant at the American founding,
whether it has continued throughout American constitutional history or
has been replaced by judicial supremacy in the interpretation and
implementation of American constitutions, whether popular
constitutionalism remains viable today, and whether, even if it is viable,
it is desirable. After all, as L.A. Powe has observed: “The fact that
Americans used certain institutions and procedures before the Civil War
is hardly an argument for using them today.”19
The preeminent contemporary exposition of popular constitutionalism
is Larry Kramer’s The People Themselves. According to Kramer, prior
to the Revolution, Americans “took for granted the people’s
responsibility not only for making, but also for interpreting and
enforcing their constitutions—a background norm so widely shared and
deeply ingrained that specific expression in the constitution was
unnecessary.”20 Likewise well-established was the repertoire of
mechanisms by which such unmediated popular intervention could
occur. These included voting, petitioning public officials, public
denunciation of unconstitutional acts in speeches and pamphlets, and
various forms of quasi-legal or illegal direct action. Sometimes this

17. KRAMER, THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES, supra note 16, at 78 (second alteration in original)
(quoting James Madison, Speech on the Jay Treaty in the Fourth Congress (April 6, 1796), in 6 THE
WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON 263 (Galliard Hunt ed., 1906)). Several other delegates to the
Philadelphia Convention likewise stressed that popular ratification was crucial. For pertinent
quotations, see FRITZ, AMERICAN SOVEREIGNS, supra note 16, at 139.
18. KRAMER, THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES, supra note 16, at 52–53. Kramer’s claim, like much of
his theory, harkens back to Jean-Jacques Rousseau, who wrote in The Social Contract: “The people
of England regards itself as free; but it is grossly mistaken; it is free only during the election of the
members of parliament. As soon as they are elected, slavery overtakes it; and it is nothing.” JEAN
JACQUES ROUSEAU, 3 THE SOCIAL CONTRACT 83 (1762).
19. L.A. Powe, Jr., Are “the People” Missing in Action (and Should Anyone Care)?: The People
Themselves: Popular Constitutionalism and Judicial Review, 83 TEX. L. REV. 855, 894–95 (2005).
20. KRAMER, THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES, supra note 16, at 53.
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direct action took the form of a refusal of the posse comitatus to
apprehend violators of unconstitutional laws, a refusal of grand juries to
indict the violators, and a refusal of petit juries to convict them through
jury nullification.21 But, in the years preceding the Revolution, it
increasingly included “mobbing” and other forms of resistance by “the
crowd” against authority. As Gordon Wood observes: “Beginning with
the revolutionary movement (but with roots deep in American history),
the American people came to rely more and more on their ability to
organize themselves and to act ‘out of doors,’ whether as ‘mobs,’ as
political clubs, or as conventions.”22 Yet whatever the means employed,
the underlying assumption was that the people had the central
responsibility for safeguarding the Constitution against its violation by
governmental officials.
Formal opportunities for popular participation in constitutional affairs
multiplied after independence with the establishment of governments
responsive to the people and with the adoption of written constitutions
that provided for constitutional change by the people. Early state
constitutions, for example, institutionalized the people’s constitutional
role through devices such as the extension of the right to vote, the power
to instruct representatives, rotation in office, and procedures for
constitutional amendment. In some constitutions, such as Maryland’s in
1776, the right to change the government was couched in language that
seemed to countenance a constitutional right to revolution:
Whenever the ends of government are perverted, and public
liberty manifestly endangered, and all other means of redress are
ineffectual, the people may, and of right ought, to reform the old
or establish a new government. The doctrine of non-resistance,
against arbitrary power or oppression, is absurd, slavish, and
destructive of the good and happiness of mankind.23
The shift to republican government, by making it easier for the people to
enforce accountability and influence the choices of officials, made it less
necessary to resort to extra-legal means to ensure that the public voice
was heard and heeded. It also subtly changed the people’s relation to
their constitutions. Whereas the people before 1776 could defend the
customary constitution against violation, after 1776 they could in
21. For a thorough discussion of the development of these techniques and their use prior to 1776,
see GORDON S. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC 1776-1787, at 319–28 (1969).
22. Id. at 319.
23. M.D. CONST. of 1776 art. IV. A writer in the late nineteenth century counted twenty states
with similar constitutional guarantees of the right to abolish the existing government. See JAMES
ALEXANDER JAMESON, A TREATISE ON CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTIONS 237 (1972).
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addition change the written fundamental law through constitutional
amendment and revision, becoming “an agent capable of ongoing,
collective self-government and, when necessary, radical constitutional
reform.”24 But what did not change, Kramer insists, were the means
available to the people for making effective their constitutional views.25
Some High Federalists26 may have contended that the creation of
institutions answerable to the people delegitimized unmediated popular
constitutionalism. Benjamin Rush, for example, argued that
[i]t is often said that “the sovereign and all other power is seated
in the people.” This idea is unhappily expressed. It should be—
‘all power is derived from the people.’ They possess it only on
the days of their elections. After that, it is the property of their
rulers, nor can they exercise it or resume it, unless it is abused.27
But this was a minority sentiment. The creation of republican
governments may have established channels for the operation of popular
constitutionalism, but according to some popular constitutionalists these
served to supplement, not displace, other forms of popular action.28
Thus, amendment provisions might provide “an easier, more orderly
mechanism for changing” constitutions, thereby reducing how frequently
unmediated popular action might be needed, but they did not foreclose
such action.29 Popular constitutionalists contend that the sovereign
people understood that they retained the authority to act directly to
ensure constitutional fidelity and to resolve constitutional disputes.30
This aspect of popular constitutionalist thought deserves particular
emphasis. Popular constitutionalists contend that the use of direct action,
even against a popularly elected government, is not necessarily
revolutionary or extra-constitutional. The people can legitimately act
outside the rules that they themselves have established. They may have
invested governing authority in their agents, but they did not thereby
cede ultimate authority over the Constitution nor give up their power and
responsibility to maintain and defend it against unconstitutional actions
by those in government. Nor did they agree to use only governmentsanctioned procedures in mounting the defense. Illustrative of popular
24. JASON FRANK, CONSTITUENT MOMENTS: ENACTING THE PEOPLE IN POSTREVOLUTIONARY
AMERICA 10 (2010) [hereinafter FRANK, CONSTITUENT MOVEMENTS].
25. KRAMER, THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES, supra note 16, at 110–18.
26. For a description of the High Federalist argument, see id. at 128–35.
27. Id. at 128–29 (emphasis in original).
28. Id. at 52–53.
29. Id. at 53.
30. Id. at 110–18.
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constitutionalism’s understanding of the continuing role of the people
“out of doors” even after the adoption of written constitutions are the
vignettes with which Kramer approvingly opens The People
Themselves.31 In the first, a jury exercises its power of nullification to
acquit a defendant who had made a constitutional argument, even though
the judges instructed the jury that his argument was legally frivolous.32
In the second, a crowd hooted down Alexander Hamilton and other
Federalist speakers defending the Jay Treaty, after they had argued that
the treaty’s constitutionality was a matter to be resolved by the President
and the Senate rather than by the people.33 In the third, he describes a
series of public meetings denouncing the Alien and Sedition Acts as
unconstitutional, with militia companies indicating that they would not
enforce such laws.34 What unites these events, at least in Kramer’s mind,
is a popular rejection of the proposition that government officials—
whether the President, the Senate, or judges—have ultimate authority
over the meaning of the Constitution and a popular assertiveness in
proposing their own interpretations of the Constitution and acting upon
them.35 Yet these popular actions were not meant to overthrow
government. Rather the people were voicing their constitutional
complaints and rising up against official authority as a prelude to—or an
impetus toward—institutional efforts to redress popular concerns. In
fact, even popular actions that scared mightily many of the founding
generation, such as Shays’ Rebellion and the Whisky Rebellion, can on
close inspection be understood as involving popular constitutionalism.36
31. Id. at 3–5. A skeptical reader might question whether the twelve jurors or the crowd that
booed Hamilton or those denouncing the Alien and Sedition Acts are really “the people” or can
even claim to represent them. After all, the Jay Treaty and the Alien and Sedition Acts had
supporters as well as opponents—indeed, several state legislatures rejected Virginia’s call that they
condemn the Alien and Sedition Acts. In such circumstances, how does one identify what the
popular understanding is on a constitutional question? Kramer himself does not adequately answer
that question. For a fuller attempt to grapple with how to identify when the people are acting, see
FRANK, CONSTITUENT MOVEMENTS, supra note 24, at 67–101.
32. KRAMER, THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES, supra note 16, at 3.
33. Id. at 4.
34. Id. at 4–5.
35. Id. at 6.
36. Christian Fritz argues persuasively that separatist movements within the states in the 1780s,
the Whiskey Rebellion, and Shays’ Rebellion can all be understood as involving popular
constitutionalism. See FRITZ, AMERICAN SOVEREIGNS, supra note 16, at 1–80. Regarding Shays’
Rebellion, he notes:
For Regulators, court closings did not overthrow the Massachusetts government but
legitimately interposed the authority of the people—as the ruler—to temporarily suspend
policies that were inherently wrong if not unconstitutional. They sought a moratorium during
which the legislature could finally grant needed relief. Such dramatic intervention would alert
the legislature—which was not the sovereign—to the discontents of the people that could be
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Kramer traces the operation of popular constitutionalism throughout
American history, but his emphasis is on the founding and the
antebellum era, given his concern to disprove that judicial supremacy is
constitutionally inevitable and that it has been largely unchallenged from
the very outset. He shows that figures as diverse as Thomas Jefferson,
James Madison, James Wilson, and John Randolph all endorsed popular
constitutionalism in the decades following independence, and he
documents
how political
practice
coincided with these
pronouncements.37 Even as judicial review gained acceptance, its
exercise prompted popular threats to judicial independence and officially
sanctioned defiance of judicial decrees.38 During the first half of the
nineteenth century, the rise of political parties created new vehicles by
which the people could influence constitutional interpretation and
implementation, and Kramer acknowledges that the rise of party politics
in effect “swallowed up” popular politics, encouraging greater reliance
on the newly established forms for popular participation and less on
unmediated popular action.39 Thus the impetus for constitutional defense
and constitutional change would typically move from the people, from
the political grassroots, to the party leadership and then to those holding
political office. Insofar as the people had more opportunities to act
through political institutions, this tended to efface—or at least narrow—
the distinction between popular constitutionalism and departmentalism.
Kramer characterizes the years between Reconstruction and the New
Deal as “a period of judicial expansion . . . [but] also a kind of golden
age for popular constitutionalism: a time rife with popular movements
mobilizing support for change by invoking constitutional arguments and
traditions that neither depended upon nor recognized—and often
denied—imperial judicial authority.”40 Populists and Progressives
proposed a variety of measures designed to check what they perceived as
judicial domination of the political process on behalf of entrenched
interests. These included the requirement of extraordinary majorities on
courts to strike down laws, the recall of judges, and the recall of judicial
decisions.41 None of these proposals were endorsed nationally, but this

redressed before the people—as the sovereign—took matters into their own hands.
Id. at 101.
37. KRAMER, THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES, supra note 16, at 48–49.
38. TARR, WITHOUT FEAR OR FAVOR, supra note 10, at 8–67.
39. KRAMER, THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES, supra note 16, at 168, 192–96.
40. Id. at 215.
41. TARR, WITHOUT FEAR OR FAVOR, supra note 10, at 58–63.
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did not prevent some states from adopting them.42 The rather limited
success of these proposals led Chief Justice Taft in 1923 to dismiss “the
so-called radicals [as] vastly more noisy than they are important.”43 But
Taft was only partially correct. The political reformers’ “advocacy of
various quixotic proposals to curtail judicial power often was intended
merely to dramatize their grievances and remind the courts that an angry
public possessed the means of curbing judicial power.”44 Once the
rulings of the courts shifted, once they ceased invalidating social and
labor legislation, the reformers lost interest in the very reforms they had
championed.45 This underscores the political character of the conflict
over popular constitutionalism and judicial supremacy. Those opposing
the courts’ rulings are typically concerned about the substance of those
rulings, what they see as judicial misinterpretations of the fundamental
law, not the fact that the rulings emanated from the judiciary. Once the
judicial obstacle to the action they favor has been removed, they no
longer have any quarrel with the courts.
The New Deal precipitated a direct clash between President Franklin
Roosevelt and a United States Supreme Court that adamantly opposed
the expansion of national power that Roosevelt sought in order to deal
with the Great Depression. Despite the strong personal mandate
Roosevelt received in the 1936 presidential election, his proposal to
reconstitute the United States Supreme Court aroused fierce opposition
not only from Republicans but from many Democrats as well.46
Proponents of popular constitutionalism have tended to view the
outcome of the Court battle as a victory: The Supreme Court had been
humbled, its constitutional rulings had changed, and a series of judicial
retirements and Roosevelt appointees ensured a Court that shared the
President’s—and the people’s—constitutional perspective.47 But
opponents of popular constitutionalism can celebrate the outcome as
well. An institutional challenge to the judiciary had been defeated, and
the Supreme Court’s authority to strike down laws had survived the

42. Id. at 56.
43. KEITH E. WHITTINGTON, POLITICAL FOUNDATIONS OF JUDICIAL SUPREMACY: THE
PRESIDENCY, THE SUPREME COURT, AND CONSTITUTIONAL LEADERSHIP IN U.S. HISTORY 264
(2009) [hereinafter WHITTINGTON, POLITICAL FOUNDATIONS OF JUDICIAL SUPREMACY].
44. WILLIAM G. ROSS, A MUTED FURY: POPULISTS, PROGRESSIVES, AND LABOR UNIONS
CONFRONT THE COURTS, 1890–1937, at 20–21 (2014).
45. Id.
46. See JEFF SHESHOL, SUPREME POWER: FRANKLIN ROOSEVELT VS. THE SUPREME COURT (1st
ed. 2010).
47. See, e.g., KRAMER, THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES, supra note 16, at 168, 219–20.
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conflict, even if it would—at least for a while—no longer give serious
scrutiny to economic regulations. As the jurisprudence of the Warren
and Burger Courts showed, this left considerable opportunity for judicial
activism in dealing with rights questions. Although some of the justices’
rulings were unpopular in the states, their activism was largely
unchallenged by the President and Congress because the Court was for
the most part serving as a faithful member of the dominant Democratic
coalition.48
Yet according to Kramer, the New Deal and the Carolene Products49
settlement, under which courts subjected laws affecting individual rights
to strict scrutiny but gave laws affecting congressional power and the
structure of government a less exacting examination, ultimately led to
judicial supremacy and a juricentric constitutionalism.50 The Supreme
Court carved out an ambitious role for itself as the constitutional
expositor in rights cases, a position vigorously supported by opinion
leaders and the legal profession, and the people and their representatives
largely acquiesced in the transfer of interpretive authority to the
judiciary.51 Once this occurred, it eroded support for judicial restraint in
dealing with other matters, such as the scope of congressional powers
(the Rehnquist Court’s New Federalism) or the outcome of presidential
elections. Thus Kramer traces the origins of contemporary judicial
activism and the accompanying rhetoric supporting judicial supremacy
to recent developments rather than to something intrinsic to the
Constitution itself.52
Having provided a historical account of popular constitutionalism,
Kramer returns to advocacy. He suggests that in the present day popular
constitutionalism involves not revolutionary acts or constitutional
revision but “some idea that the people retain authority in the day-to-day
administration of fundamental law.”53 The people will play such a role,
however, only if their understanding of what their role can be and should
be changes. But this shift will only take place if the people have
mechanisms through which they can act. Kramer thus concludes:
48. See THOMAS M. KECK, THE MOST ACTIVIST SUPREME COURT IN HISTORY: THE ROAD TO
MODERN JUDICIAL CONSERVATISM 17–103 (2004).
49. United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144 (1938).
50. KRAMER, THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES, supra note 16, at 220–26.
51. A similar development occurred in the states in the 1970s with the rediscovery of state bills of
rights by state supreme courts, a phenomenon commonly known as the new judicial federalism. See
TARR, UNDERSTANDING, supra note 14, at 161–70.
52. KRAMER, THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES, supra note 16, at 227–41.
53. Larry D. Kramer, Popular Constitutionalism, Circa 2004, 92 CALIF. L. REV. 959, 961 n.3
(2004).
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If there is an agenda for constitutionalism today, its first concern
is not substantive. It is institutional . . . . We should . . . be
asking what kind of institutions we can construct to make
popular constitutionalism work, because we need new ones. We
need to start rethinking and building institutions that can make
democratic constitutionalism possible. And we need to start
doing so now.54
II.

ALTERNATIVES

A.

Judicial Review

Some proponents of popular constitutionalism reject judicial review
altogether as incompatible with a robust popular constitutionalism. They
deride those who want judges to decide fundamental political issues as
“today’s aristocrats” and view their reliance on judicial authority as
rooted in a “deep-rooted fear of voting” and a disdain for popular rule
that is fundamentally anti-democratic.55 They see this distrust of popular
judgments on matters of political principle as particularly dominant in
academia, but its deleterious effects have spread so widely that “already
it is difficult for many, whether in or out of the academy, even to
imagine any alternative.”56 Instead, “Americans [have come] to believe
that the meaning of their Constitution is something beyond their
compass, something that should be left to others.”57 Kramer’s point is
not a lack of popular engagement but rather the sense, encouraged by
legal professionals, that the Constitution is a document only legal
professionals can understand. This development is unfortunate, popular
constitutionalists insist, because reliance on the judiciary hardly
guarantees that constitutional issues will be correctly resolved. Judicial
review furthers constitutional fidelity only if judges decide on the basis
of law rather than their own predilections and do not err in their
interpretation of that law. Yet intra-court divisions raise questions about
54. Larry D. Kramer, Response, 81 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1173, 1182 (2006) [hereinafter Kramer,
Response].
55. KRAMER, THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES, supra note 16, at 247; TUSHNET, TAKING THE
CONSTITUTION AWAY, supra note 16, at 177; see also Mark V. Tushnet, Popular Constitutionalism
as Political Law, 81 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 991 (2006).
56. ROBERT F. NAGEL, CONSTITUTIONAL CULTURES: THE MENTALITY AND CONSEQUENCES OF
JUDICIAL REVIEW 2 (1989). Thus, Roberto Unger observes that one of the “dirty little secrets of
contemporary jurisprudence” is “its discomfort with democracy.” ROBERTO MANGABEIRA UNGER,
WHAT SHOULD LEGAL ANALYSIS BECOME? 72 (1996).
57. See Michael Serota, Popular Constitutional Interpretation, 44 CONN. L. REV. 1637, 1646
(2012).
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whether judges’ legal training really gives them a privileged insight into
constitutions, and decades of research connecting judges’ votes to their
political ideologies further undermines the claim that their rulings are
insulated from politics.58 Popular constitutionalists insist that reliance on
the people instead of on their elected executives and representatives is
more compatible with the democratic character of the regime and just as
likely, if not more likely, to yield correct constitutional interpretations.59
Yet the claim that there is a fundamental incompatibility in principle
between popular constitutionalism and judicial review cannot withstand
close analysis. A key element of popular constitutionalism is that the
people have the right to choose the constitution under which they will
live, and this includes the right to place constraints on what they and
their representatives can do. The government thus created may be less
simply democratic than it could be, but that does not render it less
legitimate. So if the people have chosen to institute judicial review—
admittedly, a contested question—then this exercise of popular
constitutionalism is by definition compatible with popular
constitutionalism. Any doubts on this point come from confusing who is
choosing and the substance of what they are choosing. This, of course,
does not prove that the American people have authorized judicial review
or, more particularly, the form of judicial review that currently exists in
the United States. Nor does it suggest that, if they have, they should not
reconsider that choice. Nonetheless, this shifts the grounds of the debate
from what historically the American people have chosen to whether their
choice continues to be a wise one.
Furthermore, as is perhaps often the case, at least some critics of
judicial review seem motivated less by principled opposition than by
their disagreement with current rulings of the Supreme Court. Mark
Tushnet is quite candid about this; one suspects he is not alone.60 If this
is true, then the current enthusiasm for popular constitutionalism may be
merely the most recent manifestation of liberal distrust of judicial power,
similar to what prevailed pre-1937 and remained a potent element in
liberal thought until the rise of the Warren Court. So one may expect that
should the orientation of the United States Supreme Court shift, some of
the current support for popular constitutionalism would wane.
More importantly, Alexander Hamilton’s classic defense of judicial
review in The Federalist No. 78 suggests a way to reconcile judicial
58. See JEFFREY A. SEGAL & HAROLD J. SPAETH, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE ATTITUDINAL
MODEL REVISITED (2003).
59. KRAMER, THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES, supra note 16, at 249–53.
60. See TUSHNET, TAKING THE CONSTITUTION AWAY, supra note 16, at 129–53.
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review with democracy and popular constitutionalism. Hamilton argues
that judges are obliged to follow the will of the people that is expressed
in the Constitution rather than the will of the people’s representatives. In
exercising judicial review, they are merely serving as an intermediary
for the people, acting to prevent the people’s representatives from
exceeding their constitutional authority.61 “Only the People can change
the Constitution, and the judges must prevent Congress from making
basic changes unilaterally.”62 Or, put differently, one set of the people’s
agents is helping ensure that another set of their agents is complying
with the limits the people have set on them. Judges, therefore, have
exactly the same authority as do the other branches of government:
Namely, to make constitutional judgments when constitutional issues
come before them. The Federalist No. 78 argument thus affirms the
authority of the people’s will enshrined in the Constitution without
claiming that the interpretation of that will is exclusively a judicial
prerogative. It does not deny that the people should interpret the
Constitution or use their authority to call their agents, including judges,
to account should they misinterpret its provisions.
B.

Judicial Supremacy

Most contemporary proponents of popular constitutionalism frame
their position as an alternative to judicial supremacy: The idea that the
United States Supreme Court and its counterparts in the states are the
final authority in matters of constitutional interpretation.63 According to
advocates of judicial supremacy, the Court’s constitutional rulings are
final not only in the sense that they resolve the particular dispute at issue
and that there is no appeal from their rulings, but also in the sense that
these rulings provide the authoritative interpretation of the Constitution:
an interpretation binding on the federal government, the states, and the
people. As Justice Joseph Story framed it in his famous Commentaries
on the Constitution of the United States: “it is the proper function of the
judicial department to interpret laws, and by the very terms of the
61. THE FEDERALIST NO. 78 (Alexander Hamilton).
62. 1 BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS 192 (1991).
63. For convenience, given the fact that most authors have addressed themselves exclusively to
the United States Supreme Court and its claims of judicial supremacy, I will concentrate my
analysis on that Court and its authority; but the same arguments apply to state supreme courts and
the authority of their interpretations. However, at the state level there is more opportunity—and
willingness—to overturn judicial rulings via constitutional amendment. See generally John J. Dinan,
Foreword: Court-Constraining Amendments and the State Constitutional Tradition, 38 RUTGERS
L.J. 983 (2007).
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constitution to interpret the supreme law. Its interpretation, then,
becomes obligatory and conclusive upon all the department of the
federal government, and upon the whole people.”64 Indeed, this judicial
preeminence requires the elected branches “not only to obey that ruling
but to follow its reasoning in future deliberations,” and this deference is
required “even when other governmental officials think that the Court is
substantively wrong about the meaning of the Constitution and in
circumstances that are not subject to judicial review.”65 Thus political
opposition to the Court’s rulings or its authority is interpreted as a
challenge to the Constitution and to the judicial independence necessary
to safeguard constitutional values.
In recent decades the United States Supreme Court has become
increasingly outspoken in proclaiming its supremacy as constitutional
interpreter. Thus in Cooper v. Aaron,66 a unanimous Court asserted that
“the federal judiciary is supreme in the exposition of the law of the
Constitution . . . . [A]nd Art. VI of the Constitution makes [its rulings] of
binding effect on the States.”67 In Nevada Department of Human
Resources v. Hibbs,68 the Court confirmed that “it falls to this Court, not
Congress, to define the substance of constitutional guarantees,”69 and in
Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey,70 the
plurality opinion depicted the Supreme Court as leading a people “who
aspire to live according to the rule of law” and as “invested with the
authority to decide their constitutional cases and speak before all others
for their constitutional ideals.”71 It would not be hard, although perhaps
tedious, to multiply the examples.
One can of course oppose judicial supremacy without rejecting
judicial review—indeed, the Epilogue of The People Themselves is
64. 1 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 357 (1833).
Modern formulations are similar: “[T]he courts in general and the Supreme Court in the last analysis
have the power to decide for the government as a whole what the Constitution means . . . .”
RONALD DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE 356 (1986). Not every Supreme Court justice has shared Justice
Story’s exalted understanding of the Court’s authority. Thus, Justice Robert Jackson wrote in Brown
v. Allen, “[w]e are not final because we are infallible, but we are infallible only because we are
final.” 344 U.S. 443, 540 (1953).
65. WHITTINGTON, POLITICAL FOUNDATIONS OF JUDICIAL SUPREMACY, supra note 43, at 7;
Walter F. Murphy, Who Shall Interpret? The Quest for the Ultimate Constitutional Interpreter, 48
REV. POL. 406–07 (1986).
66. 358 U.S. 1 (1958).
67. Id. at 18.
68. 538 U.S. 721 (2003).
69. Id. at 728.
70. 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
71. Id. at 868.
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entitled “Judicial Review Without Judicial Supremacy.”72 Yet, as the
record of the United States Supreme Court and other courts over the last
several decades reveals, the claim of judicial supremacy itself
encourages judicial activism (and perhaps vice versa).73 For if it is the
responsibility of the judiciary “to speak before all others for [the
nation’s] constitutional ideals,”74 then it seems only appropriate that
judges should put forth their own constitutional understanding rather
than deferring to the constitutional understanding of the other branches
of government. A presumption of constitutionality for congressional
enactments or presidential actions makes no sense. Moreover, if “it falls
to this Court, not Congress, to define the substance of constitutional
guarantees,” then there is a temptation to embrace—or even to create—
opportunities to proclaim what the Constitution means rather than
seeking to avoid constitutional questions. Thus judicial supremacy
encourages judges, whether state or federal, to interpret restrictions—
such as the political question doctrine, mootness, and the requirement of
standing to sue—narrowly, lest these restrictions prevent them from
addressing constitutional issues. It may also lead judges to view disputes
as raising constitutional questions, questions which they should decide,
rather than as involving matters on which the Constitution is silent and
which should therefore be resolved by the political process.
Some proponents of judicial supremacy trace its origins to the
American founding, to The Federalist No. 78 and to Marbury v.
Madison,75 highlighting in particular Chief Justice John Marshall’s
statements in Marbury that the Constitution is “the fundamental and
paramount law of the nation” and that “[i]t is emphatically the province
and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is.”76 However,
as Justice Robert Jackson tartly notes: “The Constitution nowhere
provides that it shall be what the judges say it is,” and in fact there is a
“basic inconsistency between popular government and judicial
72. KRAMER, THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES, supra note 16, at 249–53.
73. See THAT EMINENT TRIBUNAL: JUDICIAL SUPREMACY AND THE CONSTITUTION (Christopher
Wolfe ed., 2004).
74. Planned Parenthood, 505 U.S. at 868.
75. 5 U.S. 137 (1803).
76. Id. at 177. Legal scholars arguing that judicial supremacy was part of the original
constitutional design include SCOTT DOUGLAS GERBER, A DISTINCT JUDICIAL POWER: THE
ORIGINS OF AN INDEPENDENT JUDICIARY: 1606-1787 (2011); H. Jefferson Powell, Enslaved to
Judicial Supremacy?, 106 HARV. L. REV. 1197 (1993), and Kathleen M. Sullivan, The NonSupreme Court, 91 MICH. L. REV. 1121 (1993). Larry Kramer rightly dismisses these claims as less
constitutional history than “a story of judicial triumphalism.” KRAMER, THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES,
supra note 16, at 229.
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supremacy.”77 It is true that “by the late 1790s the argument that courts
were peculiarly responsible for constitutional interpretation, that their
words ought indeed to be final, had become part of the Federalist
canon.”78 But this was a partisan position, put forth by a party that saw
itself losing power in electoral politics, rather than a universally
accepted view; and even Federalists did not consistently defend that
position. Thus, in a letter to Samuel Chase composed a year after
Marbury, Chief Justice Marshall himself contemplated allowing
Congress to overturn the Court’s rulings by a two-thirds majority, fearful
that an insistence by the United States Supreme Court on judicial
supremacy would risk impeachment of the justices.79
The spread of judicial review in the nineteenth century encouraged
claims of judicial supremacy, especially as judicial review became
assimilated to legal interpretation more generally.80 Such claims were
most often advanced by the judges themselves and by their allies in the
emerging legal profession.81 But this took time, because judicial review
itself advanced slowly: The United States Supreme Court struck down

77. ROBERT H. JACKSON, THE STRUGGLE FOR JUDICIAL SUPREMACY: A STUDY OF A CRISIS IN
AMERICAN POWER POLITICS vii, 3 (1941) [hereinafter JACKSON, THE STRUGGLE FOR JUDICIAL
SUPREMACY]. Larry Kramer insists that “when our Founding Fathers wrote no one had yet
imagined anything even remotely like modern judicial supremacy,” and Keith Whittington concurs
that “[j]udicial supremacy did not emerge as a fully formed and politically dominant constitutional
theory at the time of the Founding or in the early years of the nation’s history.” KRAMER, THE
PEOPLE THEMSELVES, supra note 16, at 250; see also WHITTINGTON, POLITICAL FOUNDATIONS OF
JUDICIAL SUPREMACY, supra note 43, at 10. Akhil Amar notes that claims that the Supreme Court
was the ultimate constitutional interpreter “never appeared in the United States Reports until the
second half of the twentieth century.” AKHIL REED AMAR, AMERICA’S UNWRITTEN CONSTITUTION:
THE PRECEDENTS AND PRINCIPLES WE LIVE BY 237 (2012).
78. KRAMER, THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES, supra note 16, at 135.
79. Marshall’s proposal came in a letter to Samuel Chase in which he wrote: “I think the modern
doctrine of impeachment should yield to an appellate jurisdiction in the legislature. A reversal of
those legal opinions deemed unsound by the legislature would certainly better comport with the
mildness of our character than [would] a removal of the Judge who has rendered them unknowing
of his fault.” JACKSON, THE STRUGGLE FOR JUDICIAL SUPREMACY, supra note 77, at 28.
80. On the changing understanding of judicial review during the late eighteenth and early
nineteenth centuries, see generally SYLVIA SNOWISS, JUDICIAL REVIEW AND THE LAW OF THE
CONSTITUTION (1990).
81. Thus in his Commentaries on the Constitution of the United States Justice Joseph Story
wrote:
[I]t is the proper function of the judicial department to interpret laws, and by
the very terms of the constitution to interpret the supreme law. Its
interpretation, then, becomes obligatory and conclusive upon all the
departments of the federal government, and upon the whole people, so far as
their rights and duties are derived from, or affected by, that constitution.
STORY, supra note 64, at 357.
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only two congressional statutes prior to the Civil War, and state high
courts likewise invalidated few statutes until the 1850s.82 Chief Justice
Marshall attempted to reinvigorate the idea of judicial supremacy in
McCulloch v. Maryland,83 claiming that “[o]n the Supreme Court of the
United States has the constitution of our country devolved this important
duty” to settle disputes over the “constitution of our country, in its most
interesting and vital parts.”84 His ruling provoked intense controversy,
but not because of its insistence on judicial supremacy, which was
largely ignored.85
This is not to deny that in practice a sort of pragmatic judicial
supremacy may have operated, even if principled claims for judicial
supremacy were rejected. Courts often made the final and determinative
decision in constitutional disputes, operating in a zone of political
indifference. They struck down politically inconsequential laws without
incurring political repercussions, and some of their rulings enjoyed
broad political support. Nonetheless, most scholars have concluded that
until recent decades judicial claims of interpretive supremacy arose
episodically rather than constantly, that those claims were almost always
contentious, a matter of political dispute rather than unquestioning
acceptance, and that particularly in the nineteenth century, both federal
and state officials were willing to ignore rulings with which they
disagreed or to deny their finality.86
82. The two statutes invalidated by the United States Supreme Court were a section of the
Judiciary Act of 1789, struck down in Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137 (1803), and the Missouri
Compromise of 1820, struck down in Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393 (1857). The justices were
somewhat more active in striking down state statutes—for data, see WHITTINGTON, POLITICAL
FOUNDATIONS OF JUDICIAL SUPREMACY, supra note 43, at 107. For data on judicial review in the
states during the antebellum period, see Jed Handelsman Shugerman, Economic Crisis and the Rise
of Judicial Elections and Judicial Review, 123 HARV. L. REV. 1061, 1115–42 (2010). The results of
state-specific studies of judicial review during the antebellum period are summarized in TARR,
WITHOUT FEAR OR FAVOR, supra note 10, at 26–30.
83. 17 U.S. 316 (1819).
84. Id. at 400–01.
85. On the debate engendered by McCulloch, in which Marshall himself participated, see JOHN
MARSHALL’S DEFENSE OF MCCULLOCH V. MARYLAND (Gerald Gunther ed., 1969). Kramer notes
that “[j]udicial supremacy was a small point even in the essays of Marshall and his adversaries” and
that “[p]ublic inattentiveness to the issue was mirrored as well in the new treatises on constitutional
law that seemed suddenly to be pouring from the presses.” KRAMER, THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES,
supra note 16, at 156.
86. On the political controversy over the development of judicial supremacy, see Mark A. Graber,
The Problematic Establishment of Judicial Review, in THE SUPREME COURT IN AMERICAN
POLITICS: NEW INSTITUTIONALIST PERSPECTIVES (Cornell Clayton & Howard Gillman eds., 1999);
James Stoner, Who Has Authority over the Constitution of the United States?, in THE SUPREME
COURT AND THE IDEA OF CONSTITUTIONALISM (Steven Kautz et al. eds., 2009); the essays collected
in THAT EMINENT TRIBUNAL: JUDICIAL SUPREMACY AND THE CONSTITUTION (Christopher Wolfe
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Some proponents of judicial supremacy justify it based on its
substantive effects rather than its historical pedigree. They argue first of
all that judicial supremacy fills a need for the authoritative resolution of
constitutional disputes: Indeed, the decisional finality judicial supremacy
provides is essential for maintaining the authority of the Constitution
and the rule of law. As Justice William Johnson put it:
Once admit that the decisions of that tribunal which the
Constitution has established to pronounce on the validity of
Congressional enactments, is not to be regarded as final—is not
to bind, definitively, the will of States, as well as of individuals,
(and I understand you as going the full length of this,) and no
barrier is left against mutual encroachments, mutual dissentions,
and civil war. The very cement of the Union is gone.87
More recent commentators have echoed Johnson’s sentiments. For
example, Larry Alexander and Frederick Schauer insist that absent a
“single authoritative interpreter,” there would be “interpretive anarchy”
and that the law can serve its settlement function only if other
institutions defer to the judgments of the courts.88
Other judicial supremacists contend that judicial supremacy promotes
more just, as well as more constitutionally correct, outcomes. They
maintain that judicial review, enhanced by judicial supremacy, provides
a valuable check on majoritarian tyranny and democratic excesses and
that it protects the rights of minorities, citing judicial interventions on
behalf of racial and religious minorities to bolster their case.89 Although
eschewing claims of judicial infallibility, these judicial supremacists
argue that the judges’ insulation from political influences, their training,
and their insight into political principle enables them to better resolve
contentious constitutional controversies. In making this argument, they
ed., 2004); and WHITTINGTON, POLITICAL FOUNDATIONS OF JUDICIAL SUPREMACY, supra note 43.
87. DONALD G. MORGAN, CONGRESS AND THE CONSTITUTION: A STUDY IN RESPONSIBILITY 92
(1966).
88. Larry Alexander & Frederick Schauer, On Extrajudicial Constitutional Interpretation, 110
HARV. L. REV. 1359, 1379 (1997). As Mark Tushnet observes, their argument may establish that
there is a need for a final authoritative decision-maker but not that the Supreme Court should
perform that function. See TUSHNET, TAKING THE CONSTITUTION AWAY, supra note 16, at 27–31.
89. See, e.g., Erwin Chemerinsky, In Defense of Judicial Review: A Reply to Professor Kramer,
92 CALIF. L. REV. 1013, 1013 (2004) (“[A]s I read Professor Kramer’s stunning new book about
popular constitutionalism, I kept thinking about what his theory would mean for civil rights and
civil liberties litigation. The answer is chilling. Popular constitutionalism would mean that courts
would be far less available to protect fundamental rights. The rights of minorities would be largely
left to the whims of the political majority with severe consequences for racial, ethnic, sexual
orientation, and language minorities as well as criminal defendants, public benefits recipients, and
others.”).
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typically portray the public as lacking an understanding of or attachment
to constitutional principles or as ready to jettison those principles in the
heat of the moment. “Popular constitutionalism,” they argue, “flirts with
replacing the restraints of constitutionalism with a freewheeling
reconsideration of all constitutional boundaries at the behest of popular
majorities.”90 Finally, proponents of judicial supremacy assert that
judicial resolution of disputes over abortion and other contentious issues
helps reduce divisions within the body politic and thereby contributes to
the political health of the polity.91
Unsurprisingly, popular constitutionalists dispute these claims. They
argue that the idea that there must be a final interpretive authority for
constitutional disputes confuses constitutional law with the dispute
resolution that occurs in ordinary law.92 Constitutional rulings resolve
disputes between the contending parties, just as non-constitutional
rulings do, but they go much further. They establish the law that will
govern the society, and in so doing they impinge on popular selfgovernment. As Abraham Lincoln put it in his First Inaugural Address:
[T]he candid citizen must confess that if the policy of the
Government upon vital questions affecting the whole people is
to be irrevocably fixed by decisions of the Supreme Court, the
instant they are made in ordinary litigation between parties in
personal actions the people will have ceased to be their own
rulers, having to that extent practically resigned their
Government into the hands of that eminent tribunal.93
Furthermore, popular constitutionalists deny that historically the
judiciary has been particularly protective of rights or attentive to the just
claims of racial or religious or political minorities. For every Brown v.
Board of Education94 that can be celebrated, they note, there is a Dred

90. DANIEL A. FARBER & SUZANNA SHERRY, JUDGMENT CALLS: PRINCIPLES AND POLITICS IN
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 126 (2009).
91. See, e.g., LAURENCE H. TRIBE, ABORTION: THE CLASH OF ABSOLUTES (1990).
92. KRAMER, THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES, supra note 16, at 234–36.
93. Abraham
Lincoln,
First
Inaugural
Address
(Mar.
4,
1861),
http://avalon.law.yale.edu/19th_century/lincoln1.asp [https://perma.cc/7QJS-GJW9]. Yet Lincoln’s
understanding of judicial authority was more nuanced than this frequently quoted statement seems
to suggest. Thus in 1857, Lincoln stated: “We think [the Supreme Court’s] decisions on
Constitutional questions, when fully settled, should control, not only the particular cases decided,
but the general policy of the country, subject to be disturbed only by amendments of the
Constitution as provided by that instrument itself.” BARRY FRIEDMAN, THE WILL OF THE PEOPLE:
HOW PUBLIC OPINION HAS INFLUENCED THE SUPREME COURT AND SHAPED THE MEANING OF THE
CONSTITUTION 117 (2009) [hereinafter FRIEDMAN, THE WILL OF THE PEOPLE].
94. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
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Scott v. Sandford95 and a Plessy v. Ferguson;96 for every New York
Times v. Sullivan,97 a Gitlow v. New York98 and a Dennis v. United
States;99 and it was the political branches that took the lead in
safeguarding the rights of workers, women, and the disabled. In addition,
they note that many judicial supremacists favor not merely judicial
protection of rights but—flying under the banner of non-interpretivism, a
“moral reading of the Constitution,” or other formulations—espouse
judicial revision, adaptation, and expansion of rights, a quite different
proposition.100
Popular constitutionalists also deny that courts are more competent to
decide constitutional issues, insisting that it rests on a cynically
stereotypical view of the people and their representatives and a
romanticized view of judicial decision-making. Kramer puts the point
starkly: “The modern Anti-Populist sensibility presumes that ordinary
people are emotional, ignorant, fuzzy-headed, and simple-minded, in
contrast to a thoughtful, informed, and clear-headed elite.”101 Insofar as
the people or their representatives are uninterested in constitutional
matters, popular constitutionalists maintain, the blame may lie with
judicial supremacy itself, because it curtails opportunities for popular
involvement and thereby discourages popular interest.102 In so arguing,
they are consciously aligning themselves with Thomas Jefferson, who
wrote:
I know of no safe depository of the ultimate powers of the
society but the people themselves; and if we think them not
enlightened enough to exercise their control with a wholesome
discretion, the remedy is not to take it from them but to inform
their discretion by education. This is the true corrective of
abuses of constitutional power.103
Give the people the opportunity to make constitutional judgments, they
95. 60 U.S. 393 (1857).
96. 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
97. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
98. 268 U.S. 652 (1925).
99. 341 U.S. 494 (1951).
100. For examples of such approaches to constitutional interpretation, see RONALD DWORKIN,
FREEDOM’S LAW: THE MORAL READING OF THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION (1996), and MICHAEL J.
PERRY, THE CONSTITUTION, THE COURTS, AND HUMAN RIGHTS (1982).
101. KRAMER, THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES, supra note 16, at 242.
102. Id. at 241–43.
103. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to William C. Jarvis (Sept. 28, 1820). For a parallel argument
of how “judicial overhang” affects congressional interpretation and construction of the Constitution,
see WHITTINGTON, POLITICAL FOUNDATIONS OF JUDICIAL SUPREMACY, supra note 43, at 237–39.
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argue, and the people will be motivated by constitutional principles,
although, as Mark Tushnet cautions, “[o]f course it is a fact that the
people are not committed to the Constitution’s principles as the courts
have understood them.”104 Ultimately, though, “[t]he people’s claim to
rule . . . is most persuasively put . . . not in terms of what the people
know but in terms of who they are. They are the subjects of the law, and
if the law is to bind them as free men and women, they must also be its
makers.”105
These dueling quotations do not, of course, resolve the issue. For
present purposes, it suffices to point out what is missing in the
discussion of judicial supremacy. If during the eighteenth and early
nineteenth centuries judicial supremacy was not widely accepted, how
and why did that situation change? Keith Whittington’s Political
Foundations of Judicial Supremacy masterfully traces the uneven
advance of judicial supremacy, and I shall not attempt to summarize his
analysis here, except to note that the judges lacked the power to impose
judicial supremacy on a reluctant people and their representatives. As
Whittington notes, “The American judiciary has been able to win the
authority to independently interpret the Constitution because recognizing
such an authority has been politically beneficial to others.”106
Politicians—and the people they represent—are thus not simply the
victims of judicial supremacy. They have helped create it to serve their
own ends, with some presidents among the primary supporters of
judicial supremacy.107 Indeed, some popular constitutionalists
acknowledge this. Larry Kramer observes that “[e]xcept in the most
abstract sense, ‘We the People’ have—apparently of our own volition—
handed over control of our fundamental law over to what Martin Van
Buren in an earlier era condemned as ‘the selfish and contracted rule of a
judicial oligarchy.’”108
C.

Departmentalism

In the message accompanying his veto of the bill establishing the
Second National Bank, President Andrew Jackson provides the classic
definition of departmentalism:
104. TUSHNET, TAKING THE CONSTITUTION AWAY, supra note 16, at 70 (emphasis in original).
105. Michael Walzer, Philosophy and Democracy, 9 POL. THEORY 379, 383 (1981).
106. WHITTINGTON, POLITICAL FOUNDATIONS OF JUDICIAL SUPREMACY, supra note 43, at 27.
107. Id. at 292. For an analysis of the benefits that politicians in general and presidents in
particular may derive from judicial supremacy, see id. at 82–229.
108. KRAMER, THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES, supra note 16, at 233–34 (emphasis added).
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The opinion of the judges has no more authority over Congress
than the opinion of Congress has over the judges, and on that
point the President is independent of both. The authority of the
Supreme Court must not, therefore, be permitted to control the
Congress or the Executive when acting in their legislative
capacities, but to have only such influence as the force of their
reasoning may deserve.109
Under this theory, then, there is no single authoritative voice in
interpreting the Constitution, for to elevate one branch above the others
would destroy the balance among them. Each branch of the federal
government can reach its own conclusions on constitutional matters and
act on them, but those conclusions do not bind the other coequal
branches—they are obliged to accept the conclusions only if they find
the reasoning supporting them persuasive. In particular, departmentalism
denies the judiciary a special institutional authority to say what the
Constitution means, rejecting the claimed “transubstantiation whereby
the Court’s opinion of the Constitution . . . becomes very body and
blood of the Constitution.”110 Thus for Andrew Jackson, the fact that a
unanimous Supreme Court in McCulloch v. Maryland had upheld the
constitutionality of the bank did not settle the question; nor did
congressional authorization of the First Bank of the United States from
1791–1811 and of the Second Bank of the United States from 1816
onward. The constitutional positions taken by other branches and the
arguments marshalled in support of them are entitled to respectful
consideration, but that is all. If differing constitutional understandings
develop, they might be resolved by dialogue between the branches or,
ultimately, by the people, who directly or indirectly select the officials
who serve in those branches.
It should be noted that departmentalism only pertains to the
distribution of interpretive authority within a single government,
whether federal or state. Because it is focused on separation-of-powers
concerns, it does not address who should resolve constitutional conflicts
between nation and state. The states have throughout American history
disputed the correctness or authority of United States Supreme Court
rulings, and in some instances they have successfully defied federal
mandates. This happened most often when they were able to find
political support in Congress or the President. Andrew Jackson’s oft109. Andrew
Jackson,
Veto
Message
(July
10,
1832),
http://avalon.law.yale.edu/19th_century/ajveto01.asp [https://perma.cc/S62F-DBMD].
110. EDWARD S. CORWIN, COURT OVER CONSTITUTION: A STUDY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW AS AN
INSTRUMENT OF POPULAR GOVERNMENT 68 (1938).
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reported comment—“Well, John Marshall has made his decision, now
let him enforce it”—may be apocryphal, but the practice is not.111
Nevertheless, the legitimacy of federal judicial review of state law is
clear, rooted as it is in the supremacy of federal over state law, and thus
state defiance is simply that, defiance. James Madison and Andrew
Jackson, both of whom were departmentalists at the federal level,
nonetheless rejected state nullification of federal constitutional
pronouncements.112 Although they acknowledged that states can
mobilize public opinion or use other forms of political action to oppose
perceived misinterpretations of the federal Constitution, they
nevertheless maintained that, pace John C. Calhoun, individual states
could not nullify federal action.113
Proponents of departmentalism believe that it encourages interbranch
dialogue on constitutional questions, replacing destructive attacks on the
judiciary by the President and Congress with constructive debate over
the meaning of the Constitution. In making this argument, they assume
that such virulent attacks on the judiciary arise from frustrations rooted
in impotence: one complains loudly when, under a system of judicial
supremacy, that is all one can do. In addition, departmentalists suggest
that the fact that other departments may put forth competing
constitutional arguments may serve to improve the judges’ constitutional
rulings by requiring them to advance persuasive constitutional
arguments in order to prevail. This more frequent interbranch dialogue
on constitutional issues, in turn, can be expected to promote a
heightened popular consciousness about and involvement with
constitutional issues. Finally, departmentalists view their position as
more democratic, in that it gives the power to make authoritative
constitutional interpretations to branches more directly answerable to the
people and more likely to act as the agents of the popular will.114
It is this potentially popular character of departmentalism that most

111. HENRY J. ABRAHAM, JUSTICES, PRESIDENTS, AND SENATORS: A HISTORY OF U.S. SUPREME
COURT APPOINTMENTS FROM WASHINGTON TO BUSH II 77 (5th ed. 2008).
112. For overviews of the nullification crisis, including Jackson’s and Madison’s positions and
roles in its resolution, see generally WILLIAM W. FREEHLING, PRELUDE TO CIVIL WAR: THE
NULLIFICATION CONTROVERSY CRISES IN SOUTH CAROLINA (1965) and THOMAS E. WOODS, JR.,
NULLIFICATION: HOW TO RESIST FEDERAL TYRANNY (2010).
113. See THE MIND OF THE FOUNDER: SOURCES OF POLITICAL THOUGHT OF JAMES MADISON
417–42 (Marvin Meyers ed., 1981) (reproducing James Madison’s Notes on Nullification, 18351836).
114. My account of the advantages and disadvantages of departmentalism draws on SUSAN R.
BURGESS, CONTEST FOR POLITICAL AUTHORITY: THE ABORTION AND WAR POWERS DEBATES 1–27
(1992) [hereinafter BURGESS, CONTEST FOR POLITICAL AUTHORITY].
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troubles its critics: they fear that the legislature and the executive will
base their interpretations on what is politically popular rather than on
what is constitutionally required and that this lack of commitment to the
Constitution may jeopardize rights.115 In addition, they point out that
departmentalism removes a vital check on the legislature and the
executive, allowing self-interested interpretations that undermine the
rule of law and the interbranch distribution of power. Opponents of
departmentalism further complain that conflicting constitutional
understandings among the various branches promotes confusion about
what legal standards apply and undermines the rule of law, which
requires a final determiner of legal questions.116
Several of the arguments against departmentalism resemble those
against popular constitutionalism. This is hardly surprising, for there are
important connections between those two views. Indeed, some
commentators have suggested that since the people usually cannot
directly advance their constitutional views, they must rely on the other
branches of the federal government to do so. Even Kramer, in
responding to his critics, seems to endorse this understanding. He notes
that “[m]obs were fine in their context and in their time, but no one, least
of all me, is suggesting that this is a good way to go about doing things
today.”117 Rather, he describes his “goal” as “restor[ing] a true
departmental system” as proposed by Madison and Jefferson.118
Most proponents of departmentalism, however, situate their analysis
in the context of the separation of powers, rather than popular
constitutionalism, perhaps recognizing that there are problems viewing
departmentalism as a form of domesticated popular constitutionalism.
First, departmentalism places ultimate constitutional authority in the
hands of the various branches of the government, whereas popular
constitutionalism insists that the people have the final say over
constitutional interpretation. As Saikrishna Prakash and John Yoo put it:
Kramer’s popular constitutionalism is a theory about the
external relationship between the federal government and the
polity; the people decide the Constitution’s meaning for all three
branches. Departmentalism is a theory about the internal
relationship between the three branches of the federal
government in interpreting the Constitution. Departmentalism,
whatever its merits, cannot have grand populist pretensions, for
115.
116.
117.
118.

See, e.g., supra note 82 and accompanying text.
See BURGESS, CONTEST FOR POLITICAL AUTHORITY, supra note 114, at 1–27.
Kramer, Response, supra note 54, at 1175.
Id. at 1180.
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it says absolutely nothing about the people’s constitutional
role.119
Second, in advancing their constitutional interpretations the
legislative and executive branches may be acting independently of the
people, in order to protect their institutional prerogatives or for other
purposes. Departmentalism in such instances involves constitutional
activity that is not opposed to popular constitutionalism but that occurs
outside of, or in addition to, popular constitutionalism.
Third, the legislative and executive branches are, under this
formulation, speaking for the people and acting as agents of the people.
Although they may make such a claim, their faithfulness to the popular
will cannot be presumed—the legislature and/or the executive may
depart from the popular will to pursue corrupt or misguided policies.
Indeed, lack of fidelity to the popular will may be consistent with
representative government as understood by the founders—consider
Madison’s emphasis on the “cool and deliberate sense of the
community”120 and on the importance of a senate that could stand
against popular whims or factions. Beyond that, a variety of institutions
can make the claim to be speaking on behalf of the people, even as they
express different perspectives. As Bruce Ackerman notes: “By
multiplying perspectives, Publius deflates the claims of normal officials
sitting either in Washington or in the states to speak for the People. Each
official effort is just one of a number of competing representations.”121
Fourth, when combined with the development of political parties, the
system may lead to popular subjection to the initiatives of the branches
of government and of the political parties that organize and dominate the
departments. At best, then, departmentalism may be a means—but only
one of several—by which the people can exert their influence over the
interpretation of their constitutions. In a federal system the people may
use one level of government to organize and transmit popular opposition
to constitutional initiatives at another level of government. The Virginia
and Kentucky Resolutions of the late eighteenth century are a wellknown example. And as an analysis of state constitutions will show,
there are opportunities for unmediated popular influence on constitutions
even in the twenty-first century.

119. Saikrishna Prakash & John Yoo, Against Interpretive Supremacy: The People Themselves:
Popular Constitutionalism and Judicial Review, 103 MICH. L. REV. 1539, 1544–45 (2005).
120. THE FEDERALIST NO. 63 (James Madison).
121. ACKERMAN, supra note 62, at 185 (emphasis in original).
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POPULAR CONSTITUTIONALISM: MUCH ADO ABOUT
NOTHING?

The debate over popular constitutionalism, like many scholarly
debates, has been marked by hyperbolic claims and shrill denunciations.
(My personal favorite comes from Larry Alexander and Lawrence
Solum, who write: “The People Themselves is a book with the capacity
to inspire dread and make the blood run cold.”122) Yet some scholars
question what all the fuss is about. Popular constitutionalists and judicial
supremacists may differ over who should interpret American
constitutions, but the substantive law that results may not vary
significantly regardless of who exercises ultimate interpretive authority.
For even though judges proclaim judicial supremacy, judicial rulings
tend to reflect popular constitutionalism. Thus Barry Friedman
maintains:
Ultimately, it is the people (and the people alone) who must
decide what the Constitution means. Judicial review provides a
catalyst and method for them to do so. Over time, through a
dialogue with the justices, the Constitution comes to reflect the
considered judgment of the American people regarding their
most fundamental values. It frequently is the case that when
judges rely on the Constitution to invalidate the actions of the
other branches of government, they are enforcing the will of the
American people.123
The argument of Friedman and his compatriots is that on those issues
on which the people are indifferent or on which they lack strong views,
their diffuse support for the Supreme Court—or for courts in general—
leads them to accept judicial rulings as final and authoritative. Indeed,
absent extreme rulings that adversely affect large groups of people or

122. Larry Alexander & Lawrence B. Solum, Popular? Constitutionalism?, 118 HARV. L. REV.
1594, 1594 (2005) (emphasis in original) (reviewing KRAMER, THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES, supra
note 16).
123. FRIEDMAN, THE WILL OF THE PEOPLE, supra note 93, at 367–68; see also JEFFREY ROSEN,
THE MOST DEMOCRATIC BRANCH: HOW THE COURTS SERVE AMERICA xii (2006) (“[C]ourts have
tended, over time, to reflect the will of majorities . . . .”). The analyses of Friedman and Rosen are
built on Robert A. Dahl, Decision-Making in a Democracy: The Supreme Court as a National
Policy Maker, 50 EMORY L.J. 563, 570 (reprint 2001) (1957) (“[T]he policy views dominant on the
Court are never for long out of line with the policy views dominant among the lawmaking
majorities of the United States.”). Subsequent research has revealed some problems with Dahl’s
analysis. See WHITTINGTON, POLITICAL FOUNDATIONS OF JUDICIAL SUPREMACY, supra note 43;
Jonathan D. Casper, The Supreme Court and National Policy Making, 70 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 50,
50–63 (1976); Richard Funston, The Supreme Court and Critical Elections, 69 AM. POL. SCI. REV.
795, 795–811 (1975).
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challenge their beliefs, the people are more likely to accept judicial
interpretations than to rise up and challenge them, even if they are
constitutionally suspect. Most court rulings do not so much reflect
popular constitutional views as operate in the absence of such views. But
on those high-salience issues on which the people have strong views,
Friedman insists that “constitutional doctrine tends to track public
opinion.”124 Similarly, a standard history of the Supreme Court
concludes: “In truth the Supreme Court has seldom, if ever, flatly and for
very long resisted a really unmistakable wave of public sentiment.”125 Or
as a humorist put it long ago: “[T]h[e] Supreme Co[u]rt follows th[e]
[e]l[e]ction returns,” typically issuing constitutional rulings that fall
within the political mainstream.126 Perhaps because of this, public
opinion polls document a high level of support for the United States
Supreme Court.127 Similarly, in judicial elections in the states, where the
people can directly register their satisfaction or dissatisfaction with
judicial rulings, incumbents are regularly returned to office.128 Thus, if
one equates popular constitutionalism with popular outcomes, one could
conclude that it is alive and well, notwithstanding the rise of judicial
supremacy. As Larry Alexander and Lawrence Solum pointedly ask: “If
124. Tom Donnelly, Making Popular Constitutionalism Work, 2012 WIS. L. REV. 159, 162.
Another major study, in addition to those in the preceding note that minimizes the importance of the
popular constitutionalism/judicial supremacy debate is: Powe, supra note 19.
125. ROBERT G. MCCLOSKEY, THE AMERICAN SUPREME COURT 14 (4th ed. 2005).
126. FINLEY PETER DUNNE, MR. DOOLEY AT HIS BEST 77 (Elmer Ellis ed., 1938). This may
coincide with popular expectations of the political process. Consider in this regard Franklin
Roosevelt’s description of American government as:
a three horse team provided by the Constitution to the American people so that their field
might be plowed . . . . Two of the horses [Congress and the executive] are pulling in unison
today; the third is not. . . . It is the American people themselves who are in the driver’s seat. It
is the American people themselves who want the furrow plowed. It is the American people
themselves who expect the third horse to pull in unison with the other two.
FRIEDMAN, THE WILL OF THE PEOPLE, supra note 93, at 6.
127. On the idea of diffuse institutional support and its importance for public views of the United
States Supreme Court, see Gregory A. Caldeira & James L. Gibson, The Etiology of Public Support
for the Supreme Court, 36 AM. J. POL. SCI. 635, 635–64 (1992). For analysis of data relating to
support for the United States Supreme Court, including consideration of how it compares with
public support for constitutional courts in other countries, see James L. Gibson et al., On the
Legitimacy of National High Courts, 92 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 343, 343–58 (1998).
128. On the electoral success of incumbent state judges, see CHRIS W. BONNEAU & MELINDA
GANN HALL, IN DEFENSE OF JUDICIAL ELECTIONS (2009). The success of incumbents is particularly
marked in so-called retention elections, in which they run unopposed and voters are asked merely
whether Judge X should be retained in office. See Larry T. Aspin, Retention Elections and Judicial
Behavior, 77 JUDICATURE 306, 306–15 (1994); Susan B. Carbon, Judicial Retention Elections: Are
They Serving Their Intended Purpose?, 64 JUDICATURE 210, 210–33 (1980); William K. Hall &
Larry T. Aspin, What Twenty Years of Judicial Retention Elections Have Told Us, 70 JUDICATURE
340, 340–47 (1987).
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the people have, by fifty years of tacit endorsement, given the Supreme
Court pride of place among the people’s agents, who is Kramer to
object?”129
The compatibility between public opinion and judicial rulings is
hardly coincidental. In some instances it may reflect a conscious choice
by justices to take account of public opinion in their rulings. Thus Barry
Friedman depicts Justice Sandra Day O’Connor as “splitting the
difference” between left and right and thereby arriving at solutions that
aggrandized the Supreme Court while cutting off debate in the
citizenry.130 Other scholars have documented the justices using their
discretion in reviewing cases to avoid unnecessarily inflaming public
opinion.131 In some instances, too, one can detect a popular feedback
effect, with “the resolution [of crises involving popular dissatisfaction
with judicial rulings] tend[ing] to restore a circumstance of equilibrium
between judicial action and popular preferences.”132 Even more
important, the U.S. Constitution creates a system of federal judicial
selection that ensures that over time “judicial understandings of the
Constitution are likely to be broadly convergent with political
understandings” and no judicial interpretation can long survive the
mobilized and protracted opposition of the people.133
Put differently, Article III ensures a certain form of popular
constitutionalism. The President appoints federal judges, and so the
129. Alexander & Solum, supra note 122, at 1602. Barry Friedman concurs: “For positive
scholars, the whole debate [over popular constitutionalism] is overplayed; they believe that
constitutional law typically reflects popular values, albeit at some ill-understood remove.” Barry
Friedman, The Politics of Judicial Review, 84 TEX. L. REV. 257, 322 (2005). Popular
constitutionalists deny this equivalence and, in any event, are concerned with the manner in which
constitutional law gets made as much as with its content.
130. FRIEDMAN, THE WILL OF THE PEOPLE, supra note 93, at 365.
131. Thus the Supreme Court avoided addressing the constitutionality of bans on interracial
marriage in the years immediately following Brown v. Board of Education and waited for a case that
did not provoke public outrage before extending the right to counsel to state criminal trials in
Gideon v. Wainwright. See RALPH A. ROSSUM & G. ALAN TARR, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW 32–33 (9th ed. 2014).
132. See John Ferejohn, Independent Judges, Dependent Judiciary: Explaining Judicial
Independence, 72 S. CAL. L. REV. 353, 384 (1999). The idea that the popular indifference toward
most rulings does not preclude strong reactions to disapproved ones finds support in studies of voter
scrutiny of political events more generally. Scholars have analogized voters as operating more like
fire fighters than police officers, i.e., instead of exercising constant surveillance, they react only
when an alarm indicates something is wrong. See PETER F. NARDULLI, POPULAR EFFICACY IN THE
DEMOCRATIC ERA: A REEXAMINATION OF ELECTORAL ACCOUNTABILITY IN THE UNITED STATES,
1828–2000, AT 6–10 (2007).
133. WHITTINGTON, POLITICAL FOUNDATIONS OF JUDICIAL SUPREMACY, supra note 43, at 87;
Robert Post & Reva Siegel, Popular Constitutionalism, Departmentalism, and Judicial Supremacy,
92 CALIF. L. REV. 1027, 1030 (2004).
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appointees are likely to reflect the political and constitutional views of
the Oval Office, albeit discounted perhaps by the necessity of obtaining
Senate approval of his choices. Indeed, some presidential candidates
have made the selection of judges a major theme in their campaigns,
pledging to appoint judges who better reflect popular views, and others
have made ideological compatibility their highest priority, painstakingly
seeking out the views of potential nominees.134 Should presidents be
perceived as having failed to ensure that their nominees hold the correct
political and constitutional views, the presidents’ own party may revolt,
as occurred when political conservatives forced the withdrawal of
Harriet Miers, whom President George W. Bush had nominated for the
Supreme Court. The result of presidents’ emphasis on the political and
ideological compatibility of appointees, together with turnover on the
Supreme Court, has meant that with only a short time lag, the Supreme
Court has been allied with the popularly elected branches rather than a
strong constraint upon them. From the President’s point of view that,
more than theoretical arguments about judicial supremacy, is what is
important.
One can observe a similar dynamic in the states. In appointing justices
to the state supreme court, either because the state has an appointive
system or because they are filling mid-term vacancies, governors
overwhelmingly appoint members of their own political party—more
than ninety percent share the governor’s political affiliation. This is true
even under the system of so-called merit selection, in which nominating
commissions provide governors with a list of qualified candidates from
which they must appoint—more than seventy-five percent of appointees
are of the governor’s party.135 In systems in which justices initially reach
the bench via election, most justices share the party affiliation of the
governor and/or the political majority in the state legislature. This is
particularly true in states with partisan judicial elections, because
partisan affiliation serves as an important voting cue in low-visibility
races.136 For example, as Alabama and Texas went from Democratic to
134. See generally LEE EPSTEIN & JEFFREY A. SEGAL, ADVICE AND CONSENT: THE POLITICS OF
JUDICIAL APPOINTMENTS (2005); MICHAEL COMISKEY, SEEKING JUSTICES: THE JUDGING OF
SUPREME COURT NOMINEES (2004).
135. Aman McLeod, The Party on the Bench: Partisanship, Judicial Selection Commissions, and
State High-Court Appointments, 33 JUST. SYS. J. 262, 268, tbl.3 (2012).
136. Thus an early study found a 0.84 correlation between the percentage of the vote received by
the gubernatorial candidate and by the supreme court candidate of the same party. See PHILLIP L.
DUBOIS, FROM BALLOT TO BENCH: JUDICIAL ELECTIONS AND THE QUEST FOR ACCOUNTABILITY
74–75 (1980). Later studies have reported comparable results— see, for example, Lawrence Baum,
Judicial Elections and Judicial Independence: The Voter’s Perspective, 64 OHIO ST. L.J. 13, 26
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Republican states in the last decades of the twentieth century, the
partisan affiliation of their justices shifted accordingly. There may be
some time lag in this, because elections for other offices occur more
frequently than those for supreme court justices. But over time, if one
party dominates state government, this tends to be reflected in the
composition of the state bench as well, with predictable consequences
for the substance of the courts’ rulings.137
Although there is some truth to the idea of a judiciary conforming to
the constitutional views of the prevailing political majority, ultimately
this is too simple a picture. For one thing, the account rests on a
problematic understanding of judicial decision-making. Judges are not
simply the agents of those who elevate them to the bench, and their
decisional independence, together with their developing understanding
of the law, may frustrate the hopes of those who selected them. Among
recent Supreme Court justices, Blackmun, Kennedy, O’Connor, and
Souter might all have been judged “failures” on this basis.138 For another
thing, this switch in constitutional direction on the bench occurs only if
there is a political coalition that remains in power over an extended
period of time and can appoint several justices. Yet at the national level
at least, this has not been the case in recent years. There has been no
dominant political coalition for more than half a century, with divided
government the rule rather than the exception. The presidency has
alternated between political parties since 1952, with a party only once
(1981–1993) controlling the presidency for more than two consecutive
terms, and most presidents have confronted a Congress controlled in
whole or in part by the opposing party for at least part of their tenure.
This has led to situations in which the majority in one branch of
government or one governmental institution disagrees with the majority
in another branch or institution, with each having a plausible claim to
speak for the people. When those majorities differ on constitutional
matters, as they have with abortion and same-sex marriage among other
matters, how can one say whether or not judicial rulings are following
public opinion?
Even if one focuses exclusively on the presidency, recent history has
involved an alternation of temporary political majorities, and this has
affected judicial selection, with Democratic presidents appointing
liberals to the Supreme Court, and Republican presidents appointing

(2003).
137. See TARR, WITHOUT FEAR OR FAVOR, supra note 10, at 68–89.
138. See SEGAL & SPAETH, supra note 58.
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conservatives. This in turn has led to sharp divisions on the Court, with
justices seeking to steer the Court in different directions. Divided
government has also made it difficult for the political branches to oppose
judicial activism, because if judicial rulings are attacked by one of the
political branches, they may find supporters in another. Whatever the
reason, instead of aligning with and supporting the political branches,
the Supreme Court under Chief Justices Rehnquist and Roberts has
struck down more congressional enactments than did any preceding
Supreme Court.139
Finally, the idea that judges reflect public opinion assumes a one-way
relationship, with the courts responding to public opinion. But in
actuality the relationship is far more complex.140 In some instances,
popular opposition to judicial rulings may induce judges to change
course. For example, the United States Supreme Court backed away
from earlier rulings dealing with congressional investigations of
Communists and with busing to achieve school desegregation after the
people’s representatives made clear their displeasure with those
rulings.141 Similarly, the California Supreme Court reversed course and
regularly upheld death sentences on appeal after three justices were
defeated in retention elections because of rulings perceived as based on
their personal opposition to the death penalty.142 Yet in other instances,
judges may refuse to reconsider unpopular positions they have taken,
and public opposition may eventually recede or opinion may even shift
toward the court’s position. For example, the United States Supreme
Court held firm on prayer in the schools and on most of its rulings
extending the rights of defendants despite strong popular opposition, and

139. KECK, supra note 48. Altogether forty-two of the 176 congressional statutes struck down by
the United States Supreme Court by 2013 were invalidated by the Rehnquist or Roberts courts. For
a listing of congressional statutes struck down by the Supreme Court, see Congressional Research
Service,
The
Constitution
of
the
United
States,
CONGRESS.GOV,
https://www.congress.gov/constitution-annotated [https://perma.cc/X8TG-GZK5] (last visited Feb.
23, 2016).
140. For an excellent treatment of these complexities, see Michael McCann, How the Supreme
Court Matters in American Politics: New Institutionalist Perspectives, in SUPREME COURT IN
AMERICAN POLITICS: NEW INSTITUTIONALIST INTERPRETATIONS (Cornell Clayton & Howard
Gillman, eds., 2007).
141. On congressional investigations of Communists, see WALTER F. MURPHY, CONGRESS AND
THE COURT: A CASE STUDY IN THE AMERICAN POLITICAL PROCESS (1962); and on busing, see J.
HARVIE WILKINSON, FROM BROWN TO BAKKE: THE SUPREME COURT AND SCHOOL INTEGRATION:
1954–1978 (1981).
142. See Barry Latzer, California’s Constitutional Counterrevolution, in CONSTITUTIONAL
POLITICS IN THE STATES: CONTEMPORARY CONTROVERSIES AND HISTORICAL PATTERNS 149, 157–
58 (G. Alan Tarr ed., 1996).
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the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court did the same despite criticism
of its ruling on same-sex marriage.143 In still other instances, the public
may accept judicial rulings as authoritative even on issues on which it
has strong opinions—consider, for example, Bush v. Gore,144 in which
the Supreme Court decided the 2000 presidential election—perhaps
because of popular respect for the Court as an institution or because of a
perception that the Constitution assigns the Court the responsibility to
decide the issue.145 In addition, it is no more appropriate to equate
popular quiescence with popular approval of judicial rulings than it
would be to claim popular support for a political regime because the
people are not in open revolt. The people may not be aware of some
rulings, they may be indifferent to others, they may disagree with rulings
but find the costs of opposition greater than the costs of acquiescence, or
they may not perceive any way to oppose the Court and enforce popular
constitutional understandings. Yet insofar as judicial interpretation of the
Constitution does not simply lead to constitutional rulings reflecting
public opinion, something remains at stake in the popular
constitutionalism vs. judicial supremacy debate.
Finally, popular constitutionalists insist that it is not enough that the
courts’ high-salience rulings track popular views. Aggressive judicial
review, combined with claims of judicial supremacy, tends to discourage
popular interest in and involvement with constitutional matters, because
they seem to suggest that the people have no role to play on such
matters. In this, the popular constitutionalists echo the concern of James
Brady Thayer, who complained more than a century ago that “[t]he
tendency of a common and easy resort to this great function [of judicial
review], now lamentably too common, is to dwarf the political capacity
of the people, and to deaden its sense of moral responsibility.”146 Popular
constitutionalism is valuable, according to its advocates, because it

143. On the aftermath of the Supreme Court’s school prayer rulings, see STEVE K. GREEN, THE
BIBLE, THE SCHOOL, AND THE CONSTITUTION: THE CLASH THAT SHAPED MODERN CHURCH-STATE
DOCTRINE (2013). On the Supreme Judicial Court’s refusal to compromise on civil unions after
criticism of its ruling on same-sex marriage, see In re Opinions of the Justices to the Senate, 802
N.E. 565 (Mass. 2004).
144. 531 U.S. 98 (2000).
145. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000). Of course, the popular perception that the Supreme Court
was doing nothing extraordinary underscores the effect that experience with judicial activism and
claims of judicial supremacy have on public understandings. For a popular constitutionalist like
Larry Kramer, Bush v. Gore was a usurpation of popular authority. For a broader context, see RAN
HIRSCHL, TOWARDS JURISTOCRACY: THE ORIGINS AND CONSEQUENCES OF THE NEW
CONSTITUTIONALISM (2004).
146. JAMES BRADLEY THAYER, JOHN MARSHALL 107 (1901).
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involves citizens in the discussion and resolution of constitutional
matters, because it encourages that “frequent recurrence to fundamental
principles”147 without which government by “We the People” cannot
long survive. Insofar as judicial rulings dominate constitutional
interpretation and thus short-circuit this popular participation, something
valuable is lost.
CONCLUSION
If the case of popular constitutionalism is persuasive—and I am
inclined to think that it is—then an agenda suggests itself. This agenda is
organized around the constitutional tasks or functions that are involved
in the creation, maintenance, and operation of polity. These include: (1)
the creation of the constitution; (2) the revision (replacement) of an
existing constitution by a new constitution; (3) constitutional change that
involves less than complete replacement, whether by constitutional
amendment or other means; (4) the interpretation of the constitution; (5)
the protection of the constitution against misinterpretation or evasion by
governmental authorities; and (6) the implementation of the constitution
in everyday political life. Thus, the first and second tasks are associated
with the creation or re-creation of the constitutional order; the third,
fourth, and fifth with constitutional maintenance and constitutional
change; and the sixth (and to some extent the fourth) with making the
constitution an effective instrument of governance. Scholars and
political activists alike need to consider what opportunities exist for a
robust popular constitutionalism in the performance of these tasks. Some
scholars, such as Sanford Levinson and Steven Griffin, have already
begun to explore these possibilities, but much more needs to be done to
empower and energize “We the People.”148

147. VA. DECLARATION OF RIGHTS § 15 (1776).
148. See STEVEN M. GRIFFIN, BROKEN TRUST: DYSFUNCTIONAL GOVERNMENT AND
CONSTITUTIONAL REFORM (2015); SANFORD LEVINSON, FRAMED: AMERICA’S FIFTY-ONE
CONSTITUTIONS AND THE CRISIS OF GOVERNANCE (2012); SANFORD LEVINSON, OUR
UNDEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTION: WHERE THE CONSTITUTION GOES WRONG (AND HOW WE THE
PEOPLE CAN FIX IT) (2006). For a judicial contribution to this literature, see JOHN PAUL STEVENS,
SIX AMENDMENTS: HOW AND WHY WE SHOULD CHANGE THE CONSTITUTION (2014).

